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1INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE
William Baude and Stephen E. Sachs are professors at
the University of Chicago Law School and Duke
University School of Law, respectively. They teach and
write about constitutional law and conflict of laws and
have an interest in the sound development of these
fields.1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case presents the question whether to overrule
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979). That question
requires careful attention to the legal status of
sovereign immunity and to the Constitution’s effect on
it, which neither Hall nor either party has quite right.
The Founders did not silently constitutionalize a
common-law immunity, contra Pet. Br. 35–36, but
neither did they leave each State wholly free to hale
other States before its courts, contra Br. in Opp. (BIO)
13–14. While Hall’s holding was mostly right, other
statements in Hall are likely quite wrong—yet this
case is a poor vehicle for reconsidering them. 
1All parties have submitted letters granting blanket consent to
amicus curiae briefs. No counsel for a party authored this brief in
whole or in part, and no counsel or party made a monetary
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this
brief. Duke University School of Law provides financial support for
activities related to faculty members’ research and scholarship,
which helped defray the costs of preparing this brief. (The School
is not a signatory to this brief, and the views expressed here are
solely those of the amici curiae.) No other person or entity, other
than the amici curiae, has made a monetary contribution intended
to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.
21. Hall correctly held that States lack a
constitutional immunity in sister-state courts. The
Founders viewed each State as immune from such suits
under the common law and the law of nations. Before
the Constitution’s enactment, this was plainly not a
constitutional right, and nothing in the Constitution
changed that. Thus, Hall properly rejected the
argument that there is a “federal rule of law implicit in
the Constitution that requires all of the states to
adhere to the sovereign-immunity doctrine as it
prevailed when the Constitution was adopted.” 440
U.S. at 418.
A plain reading of the Constitution’s text reveals no
affirmative guarantee of sister-state immunity. Unless
otherwise specified “in the plan of the convention,” The
Federalist No. 81, at 549 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob
E. Cooke ed., 1961), the Constitution takes the States’
sovereign rights as it finds them. The Founders left the
rules of sister-state immunity precisely as they were:
as ordinary rules of common law and the law of
nations, to be enforced through ordinary channels. The
Franchise Tax Board treats the Founders’ broad
support for sovereign immunity as evidence of its
constitutional stature. Pet. Br. 23–28. But it is a
“fundamental mistake” to “quote prominent Framers
without investigating the legal basis for their
conclusions.” Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine
of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1559, 1653
(2002).
In essence, the Board argues that the issue is of
constitutional significance, so it must be addressed
somewhere in the Constitution—and that the Court
has wandered from the text before, so it may as well do
3so here. Pet. Br. 18–20, 34–39. That sells this Court’s
decisions short. The “fundamental postulates” of
immunity recognized by this Court, Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706, 729 (1999), are bona fide rules of common
law, “backdrop” legal principles that the Constitution
indirectly protects from federal abrogation. See
generally Baude, Sovereign Immunity and the
Constitutional Text, 103 Va. L. Rev. 1 (2017); Sachs,
Constitutional Backdrops, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1813,
1816–19, 1868–75 (2012). Article III simply declines to
abrogate certain State immunities from suit, see Hans
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); Monaco v. Mississippi,
292 U.S. 313 (1934), and Article I likewise declines to
grant Congress an enumerated power to do so, see
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996);
Alden, 527 U.S. 706. Neither these refusals to grant
additional powers to the Federal Government, nor the
Eleventh Amendment’s further restriction of the
federal judicial power, impose any constitutional
restraints on State governments—which retain every
power “not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States.” U.S.
Const. amend. X. 
2. Hall went too far, however, in denying that “the
Constitution places any limit on the exercise of one
State’s power to authorize its courts to assert
jurisdiction over another State,” 440 U.S. at 421
(emphasis added), and in reducing sister-state
immunity to a “matter of comity,” id. at 425. In
particular, Hall was likely wrong to assume that a
State’s abrogation of immunity in its own courts could
be projected outward so as to bind other state and
federal courts.
4Even without a direct guarantee of sister-state
immunity, the Constitution may well offer substantial
indirect protection rooted in the law of judgments.
Whatever a State’s power to prescribe rules for its own
courts, it cannot force other courts to take notice of “a
jurisdiction which, according to the law of nations, [the]
sovereign could not confer.” Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 241, 276–77 (1808). Early federal and state
courts routinely refused full faith and credit to state
judgments that exceeded the jurisdictional limits
imposed by the law of nations and the common law.
These same principles would provide ample protection
for States today, shielding them from suit in sister-
state courts without inventing a novel constitutional
rule.
3. In an appropriate case, these principles might
justify revisiting and narrowing portions of Hall. Yet
this case is a poor vehicle for doing so.
A State threatened by suit in a sister-state court
has many options, ranging from default to a federal
action against the plaintiff to an original-jurisdiction
action against the offending State. Each of these
options might allow a federal court, including this
Court, to enforce California’s common-law immunity
from suit. 
The Board has done none of these things. Instead,
it appeared in Nevada’s courts, lost its state-court
litigation, and then sought review in this Court on
federal-question grounds. Yet sister-state immunity is
not a rule of federal law that can support federal-
question jurisdiction. And the Board’s appearance may
have waived its right to shield itself from the Nevada
judgment under other heads of jurisdiction.
5More urgently, on a faithful reading of the Eleventh
Amendment’s text, this Court’s own subject-matter
jurisdiction is in serious doubt. Gilbert Hyatt’s suit
against the Board is one “commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State”—to which “[t]he Judicial power of the United
States,” including the power vested in this Court, “shall
not be construed to extend.” U.S. Const. amend. XI.
Though the Court has announced exceptions to the
Eleventh Amendment in similar cases, these cases did
not adequately address the Amendment’s text and
history. This issue is jurisdictional, and it would need
to be reexamined sua sponte before the Court could
reach the merits.
Because the case has been improperly framed by the
parties and cannot be resolved properly without further
briefing, the Court should dismiss the writ as
improvidently granted. Alternatively, it should dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction—or, if satisfied of its
jurisdiction, should affirm.
ARGUMENT
I. The Constitution does not entrench sister-
state immunity as a constitutional rule.
Hall rejected the argument that sister-state immunity
was a “federal rule of law implicit in the Constitution.”
440 U.S. at 418. It was correct to do so, and that part of
Hall should not be disturbed.
This is not to deny the legitimacy and importance of
sovereign immunity. This Court has properly
recognized the States’ “immunity from suit [as] a
fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which [they]
enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution.”
6Alden, 527 U.S. at 713. Before the Constitution,
however, sovereign immunity was not a rule of
constitutional law, but rather of the common law and
“the general law of nations” that protected the States
as separate sovereigns. Nelson, supra, at 1574.
We are aware of no contemporaneous evidence that
Ratification somehow transformed this unwritten
immunity into a constitutional rule. Instead, the only
debate at the Founding concerned whether Article III
would empower federal courts to disregard the States’
preexisting immunities. Alexander Hamilton, James
Madison, John Marshall, and James Iredell all believed
the Constitution did not affect the States’ immunity to
individual suits, and the Eleventh Amendment then
“cut off” the only portion of Article III that even
arguably spoke to the question. Hollingsworth v.
Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 381 (1798) (argument of
Attorney General Charles Lee). The Constitution left
sister-state immunity alone, neither abrogating it nor
transforming it into a rule of constitutional law.
While the States’ immunities from suit do indeed
extend more broadly than does the Eleventh
Amendment, they do not rest on mysterious penumbras
and emanations from the federal structure, nor on the
unenacted hopes and dreams of the Founding
generation, cf. Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc.,
562 U.S. 323, 343 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment). Instead, they rest on specific rules of law
that the Constitution left alone. Those rules of law
were indirectly preserved by the Constitution, but not
constitutionalized; they persist through the absence of
federal power to override them, and not through any
affirmative constitutional guarantee.
7A. Before the Constitution, sovereign
immunity was a doctrine of common law
and the law of nations.
Sovereign immunity was not invented by the
Constitution. Long before the Philadelphia Convention,
the thirteen original States were not amenable to each
other’s jurisdiction, and they could not be haled into
each other’s courts. The common law and the law of
nations afforded them immunity from what we would
now call personal jurisdiction: as sovereigns, they could
not be subjected to compulsory process, and they could
only be sued by consent. See Nelson, supra, at 1565,
1568, 1574; Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s
Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 Cal. L.
Rev. 555, 559, 583 (1994); cf. 4 William Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England *67 (describing
the law of nations as part of the common law).
This traditional immunity had no constitutional
source and needed none. In 1781, a Philadelphia
plaintiff sought to compel Virginia’s appearance by
attaching its goods. Nathan v. Virginia, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.)
77 n. (Pa. C.P. Phila. County 1781). At the time, the
newly enacted Articles of Confederation had already
imposed full faith and credit obligations on the States,
deprived them of the rights to make treaties or to
engage in war, and created a tribunal to hear “all
disputes and differences *** between two or more
States.” Articles of Confederation of 1781 arts. IV, VI,
IX. Yet none of this transformed the States’ basic
relationship as mutual sovereigns, nor did the Articles’
structure or values determine the decision in Nathan.
Instead, both parties in Nathan understood the case
to turn directly on the law of nations. Pennsylvania’s
8attorney general argued that “every kind of process,
issued against a sovereign, is a violation of the laws of
nations; and is in itself null and void,” meaning that
the court “had no jurisdiction over Virginia.” Nathan,
1 U.S. at 78 n. (argument of counsel); accord Letter
from Joseph Reed to Virginia Delegates (July 10, 1781),
in 3 The Papers of James Madison: Congressional
Series 187, 187 n.2 (William T. Hutchinson et al. eds.,
1963). The only significance of the Articles was that
they did nothing—leaving each State’s sovereignty
intact, “with every power, jurisdiction, and right, not
expressly given up.” Nathan, 1 U.S. at 78 n. (argument
of counsel) (paraphrasing Articles of Confederation art.
II). The plaintiff’s counsel in Nathan did likewise,
arguing that the law of nations afforded only a limited
immunity. Id. at 79 n. The court agreed with the
attorney general and upheld the broader immunity, as
did another court considering a similar case the same
year. Id. at 80 n.; Moitez v. The South Carolina, 17 F.
Cas. 574 (Pa. Adm. 1781) (No. 9697).
B. Ratification did not alter the legal
status of sovereign immunity.
Like the Articles, the Constitution largely left the
States’ sovereign immunity alone. The Board portrays
Ratification as an agreement to constitutionalize the
rules of sovereign immunity. Pet. Br. 35. But that is
wrong as a matter of both text and history. 
As to text, the Board points to such features as the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, the limits on state treaty
and war powers, and the creation of independent
federal tribunals to argue that Ratification transformed
the nature of sovereign immunity. Pet. Br. 31–32. But
9these features were all present in the Articles, and so
they marked no transformation. 
As to history, the Board points to the near-universal
conviction at the Founding that States were not
amenable to suit in sister-state courts. Pet. Br. 21–28.
But the Founders spoke of these immunities as
common-law rules, not constitutional ones. The
Constitution’s supporters assumed that “background
principles of general law would continue to protect
states from being haled into court without their
consent”; the only relevant question was whether
Article III would override these principles with new
constitutional rules. Nelson, supra, at 1568. For some
suits against States, such as those filed by a sister
State or the Federal Government, Article III was
indeed understood to waive jurisdictional immunities.
See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12
Pet.) 657, 720 (1838); cf. United States v. Mississippi,
380 U.S. 128, 140–41 (1965). At the same time,
prominent Founders denied that the Constitution
reflected similar consent to individual suits, assuring
skeptics that this common-law immunity would survive
Ratification. They did not argue that the Constitution
itself ratified this immunity, nor did they treat
sovereign immunity generally as a new rule of
constitutional law.
Hamilton, for example, rejected the argument that
the state-diversity clauses could be interpreted as
abrogating sovereign immunity. He argued that it was
“inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be
amenable to the suit of an individual without its
consent,” and that the power to compel sovereigns to
appear could not be “ascribe[d] to the federal courts, by
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mere implication.” The Federalist No. 81, supra, at
548–49. Because this immunity was not surrendered
“in the plan of the convention,” he argued, “it will
remain with the states.” Id. at 549. This argument was
entirely negative: it articulated the law by highlighting
what the Constitution had not done to change it.
Madison likewise focused on what the Constitution
would leave alone. He drew an analogy between
sovereign immunity and other common-law doctrines,
such as coverture and alienage, that had not been
abrogated by the heads of federal jurisdiction. As he
put it, “[a] femme covert may be a citizen of another
state, but cannot be a party in this court”; and an “alien
enemy,” though diverse from “a citizen of this state, ***
cannot bring suit at all.” 3 The Debates in the Several
State Conventions 533 (Jonathan Elliott ed., Phila.,
J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1891) (Elliott’s Debates).
Madison’s point was not that Article III
constitutionalized the law of coverture and alienage,
transforming them into permanent limits on federal
jurisdiction. Rather, the Constitution simply took these
common-law capacity rules as it found them, as
separate doctrines (like preclusion or estoppel) under
which an otherwise well-pleaded suit might fail.
Because sovereign immunity was another such
doctrine, the state-diversity provision could in practice
“have no operation but this—to give a citizen a right to
be heard in the federal courts; and if a state should
condescend to be a party, this court may take
cognizance of it.” Id.; see also Baude, supra, at 9–10;
Sachs, Backdrops, supra, at 1870–71; accord 3 Elliott’s
Debates, supra, at 555–57 (John Marshall).
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James Iredell’s famous dissent in Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), adopted the same
reasoning. Though he concentrated on statutory
questions, Iredell also contended that the States’
preexisting immunities had been left unaffected:
“[E]very word in the Constitution may have its full
effect without involving this consequence, and ***
nothing but express words, or an insurmountable
implication *** would authorise the deduction of so
high a power.” Id. at 450. Iredell understood the
“Conventional Law of Nations,” id. at 449, to preserve
the States’ sovereign rights “[i]n every instance where
authority has not been so surrendered,” James Iredell’s
Observations on State Suability (Feb. 11–14, 1792), in
5 The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of
the United States, 1789–1800, at 76, 82 (Maeva Marcus
ed., 1994) (DHSC). And when the Eleventh Amendment
constitutionalized some of the States’ immunities, it
eliminated the only portion of Article III that could
plausibly have justified a contrary construction—
instructing that “[t]he Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend” to private
state-diversity suits. U.S. Const. amend. XI.
The Board repeatedly confuses the Founders’ choice
not to abrogate sovereign immunity with a decision to
entrench it, transforming the traditional common-law
immunities into new rules of constitutional law. See
Pet. Br. 3, 20, 23, 36. But no clause actually works such
a transformation, and none was needed. The
Constitution simply leaves those rules alone.
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C. The Constitution indirectly preserves
the States’ common-law immunities by
declining to authorize their abrogation.
The only provision of the Constitution that does
address sovereign immunity is the Eleventh
Amendment. Since that Amendment’s adoption, the
Court has applied immunity doctrines in many
contexts that cannot be explained by reference to its
terms. The Amendment applies only to suits where
diversity is present, and not to federal-question suits
by a State’s own citizens—as in Hans, 134 U.S. 1, or
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44. And it applies only to
federal courts, and not to state courts—as in Alden, 527
U.S. 706, or here.
The Court’s cases are correct, but the Board is
wrong about why. The Board celebrates these cases as
recognizing immunity “beyond the constitutional text,”
Pet. Br. 19, and it criticizes “undue focus on the
constitutional text” in favor of broader claims about
“the federal structure of the Union.” Pet. Br. 18, 35. Yet
the Founders and the Court were more faithful to the
text than the Board credits. Though the common-law
rules of immunity were not directly entrenched, they
are indirectly protected by features of the written
Constitution. That text creates a government of limited
powers, safeguarding state sovereign immunity from
Congress simply by granting no power to upset it. As a
result, common-law immunity can explain modern
doctrine without any makeshift structural supports.
Sometimes the Constitution’s text forbids certain
changes to a nonconstitutional rule. The classic
example is the law of sovereign borders. The
Constitution says nothing about where the States begin
13
and end, how they are affected by accretion and
avulsion, and so on. It simply declines to “Prejudice”
their territorial claims, U.S. Const. art. IV, §3, cl. 2,
forbids Congress from redrawing state lines, id. cl. 1,
and establishes federal tribunals to resolve territorial
disputes, id. art. III, §2, cl. 1—which they do by
reference to “ordinary background law,” New Jersey v.
New York, 523 U.S. 767, 813 (1998) (Breyer, J.,
concurring); see Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 Tex. L.
Rev. 1249, 1255–69 (2017). “Backdrop” rules like these
are not part of the Constitution, but they resemble
constitutional rules in effect, as bona fide constitutional
rules serve to keep them in force.
The traditional rules of sovereign immunity were
nonconstitutional rules of this kind, which were
sometimes kept in force by rules of constitutional law.
For example, Justice Iredell in Chisholm understood
Georgia’s common-law immunity to survive Article III’s
specific state-diversity provision. That common-law
immunity is not a distinct requirement of Article III,
but a common-law rule that Article III declines to
abrogate and allows to operate of its own force. The
immunity likewise survives Article III’s other, more
generic heads of jurisdiction—thereby explaining the
holding in Hans, which refused to read the grant of
federal-question jurisdiction as authorizing “suits and
actions unknown to the law,” 134 U.S. at 15. These
suits and actions remain unauthorized, unless the
States’ common-law immunity can be abrogated by
other means. See Baude, supra, at 9–10.
For similar reasons, a generic Article I power to
“regulate Commerce *** with the Indian Tribes,” U.S.
Const. art. I, §8, cl. 3, need not confer a power to
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abrogate a State’s immunity—thereby explaining the
holding in Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 70 & n.13.
Although Congress may pass laws “necessary and
proper” to carrying other powers into execution, U.S.
Const. art. I, §8, cl. 18, abrogating the States’ sovereign
rights may well be a “great substantive and
independent power, which cannot be implied as
incidental to other powers,” and which must be
enumerated explicitly if it is to be conferred at all.
M‘Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411
(1819); see Baude, supra, at 15; Nelson, supra, at 1640.
If Congress has no Article I abrogation power, then the
preexisting common-law rules of immunity remain in
force by default.
And if Congress generally lacks power to abrogate
a State’s immunity in federal court, then a fortiori it
lacks power to do so in state court, where its Article I
powers are no greater—thereby explaining the holding
in Alden, 527 U.S. at 741. The substance of the
immunity is inherited “from the common-law
tradition,” but the common-law rules are effectively
“protected by the Constitution,” and Congress’s limited
power to abrogate them “exists today by constitutional
design.” Id. at 733–34; see Baude, supra, at 16–17. 
An enumerated power to abrogate might be
available on some topics but not others. Perhaps
abrogation is “appropriate” for enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment, though not necessary and
proper to regulating Indian commerce. Compare
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), with
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59, 70. In any case, this is
“ultimately a question of enumerated powers,” Baude,
supra, at 21—which turns on the details of each
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particular power, and not on abstract visions of “federal
structure,” Pet. Br. 35.
The Board’s structural argument in this case,
however, reverses the ordinary presumptions of
constitutional interpretation. The Board suggests that
the States necessarily “relinquished jurisdiction”
whenever “adjudication in state court would be
inconsistent with the federal structure.” Pet. Br. 35.
But under our Constitution, “[t]he powers delegated
*** to the Federal Government, are few and defined,”
while “[t]hose which are to remain in the State
Governments are numerous and indefinite.” The
Federalist No. 45 (James Madison), supra, at 313. It is
dangerous to read Founding-era references to
structural limits on federal judicial power as imposing
similar limits on the power of the state judiciaries.
The enumerated-powers theory that supports
Seminole Tribe and Alden does not extend to the
States, which are “bound by neither Article I, nor
Article III, nor the Eleventh Amendment.” Baude,
supra, at 25. Rather, the States retain every power
with which they entered the Union—including any
power to abrogate another State’s immunity within
their own courts—that has not been “delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States.” U.S. Const. amend. X. That is why Hall
pointed to “the Tenth Amendment’s reminder,”
requiring “caution *** before concluding that unstated
limitations on state power were intended by the
Framers.” 440 U.S. at 425. And that is also why Alden
quoted Hall and emphasized that the Constitution
“treats the powers of the States differently from the
powers of the Federal Government.” 527 U.S. at 739.
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Those conclusions should not be disturbed, because
they are correct.
II. The Constitution may enforce sister-state
immunity indirectly, by refusing to
guarantee the recognition of judgments.
At first glance, the rule in Hall might seem absurd:
surely the Constitution does not leave state courts free
to hear any lawsuit they wish against other States.
That intuition is understandable, but misdirected.
While Hall was correct to reject an unenumerated right
of sovereign immunity, it was likely quite wrong to
reduce sister-state immunity to a “matter of comity,”
440 U.S. at 425, or to deny that “the Constitution
places any limit” on sister-state jurisdiction, id. at 421
(emphasis added). Our federal system may well limit a
State’s power to abrogate sister-state immunity,
through the lack of binding effect such judgments
would have in other courts.
Because sovereign immunity is a rule of common
law and the law of nations, a State can abrogate it
within its own courts, just as it can abrogate the
common-law rules of coverture, burglary, or respondeat
superior. See The Schooner Exchange v. M‘Faddon, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 143 (1812); see also Baude, supra,
at 27–28. But the State’s power may well end there. As
nearly a century of history suggests, the original
Constitution did not force state or federal courts to
respect the judgment of a court which lacked power
over the defendant under traditional jurisdictional
principles. Sister-state immunity was just such a
principle. Thus, a State which tries to abrogate that
immunity may find its judgments without effect in
other American courts.
17
If so, the Constitution allows States to resist
improper sister-state jurisdiction through the same
mechanisms it long used to address improper state-
court jurisdiction generally. The Founders did not
necessarily leave sister-state immunity out of the
constitutional text because it was “not a matter of
concern,” Hall, 440 U.S. at 418–19, or because “it was
too obvious to deserve mention,” id. at 431 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). Instead, the topic may simply have
needed no attention, because adequate off-the-shelf
protections were already in place. 
A. The law of nations allowed sovereigns to
abrogate others’ immunities only within
their own courts.
Among nations, sovereign immunity traditionally
depended on the forum’s consent, in that the local
sovereign could always instruct local courts not to
respect it. As Chief Justice Marshall explained in The
Schooner Exchange, “all exemptions from territorial
jurisdiction, must be derived from the consent of the
sovereign of the territory.” 11 U.S. at 143. In the eyes
of the law of nations, a sovereign always had the
power, if not always the right, to “exercise its territorial
powers in a manner not consonant to the usages and
received obligations of the civilized world.” Id. at 137.
Similarly, as Justice Story noted in The Santissima
Trinidad, a sovereign could always “withdraw[]” its
consent to allowing foreign warships to enter, “without
just offence”; but it still could not rightfully compel “a
foreign sovereign *** to appear in our Courts, or [to] be
made liable to their judgment, so long as he remains in
his own dominions.” 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 353 (1822).
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By the same token, sovereigns had no power on
their own to make their judgments against other
sovereigns effective in other courts. In the
international context, such judgments might be
recognized only as a matter of comity. See generally
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). And one reason
for refusing recognition might be that the rendering
court had violated international law: “[I]f it exercises a
jurisdiction which, according to the law of nations, its
sovereign could not confer, however available its
sentences may be within the dominions of the prince
from whom the authority is derived, they are not
regarded by foreign courts.” Rose, 8 U.S. at 276–77;
accord Bradstreet v. Neptune Ins. Co., 3 F. Cas. 1184,
1187 (Story, Circuit Justice, CCD Mass. 1839) (No.
1793); Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of
Laws §586, at 492 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1834).
That may be why, in Nathan, Pennsylvania’s
attorney general described the offending process as
“void.” 1 U.S. at 78 n. In the eyes of the law of nations,
“Pennsylvania lacked the power, by its own unilateral
legislative or constitutional act, to abrogate Virginia’s
immunity.” Pfander, supra, at 582 n.102. Even today,
“foreign sovereign immunity is a matter of grace and
comity on the part of the United States,” Verlinden
B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486
(1983); but if the United States departs from accepted
international practice, it cannot guarantee that its
judgments will continue to be recognized abroad.
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B. States may owe no faith and credit to
judgments that violate sister-state
immunity.
Ordinarily, a State must recognize the judgment of
another State’s court under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and its implementing statute. U.S. Const. art.
IV, §1; 28 U.S.C. §1738 (2012). Hall therefore assumed
that a single State’s abrogation of immunity would
automatically be effective nationwide. See 440 U.S. at
421.2 This assumption may well have been incorrect,
and it could be revisited in an appropriate case.
As Hall noted, effect is only given to judgments
issued with “jurisdiction over the parties.” Id. Yet the
core of the Founding-era immunity doctrine was that
States were not amenable to jurisdiction without their
consent. For nearly a century after the Founding,
courts enforced traditional limits on jurisdiction by
refusing recognition to improper judgments, even if
they were considered lawful where they were rendered.
A State that abrogated sister-state immunity would
have found the resulting judgments unrecognized in
other courts.
Beginning under the Articles of Confederation—
which also contained a full faith and credit
clause—courts expected “competent jurisdiction” under
“common law rules” before giving a judgment “due faith
and credit” under “[t]he act of confederation *** and
the law of nations.” Jenkins v. Putnam, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay)
2 This full-faith-and-credit issue is distinct from that addressed in
Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 136 S. Ct. 1277 (2016), namely
whether a State violates the Clause when prescribing the law for
its own courts. 
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8, 10 (1784) (per curiam); see Sachs, Full Faith and
Credit in the Early Congress, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1201,
1221–26 (2009). This practice continued under the
Constitution. See, e.g., M‘Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13
Pet.) 312, 326–27 (1839); Flower v. Parker, 9 F. Cas.
323, 324–25 (Story, Circuit Justice, CCD Mass. 1823)
(No. 4891); Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. (9 Tyng) 462, 467
(1813) (opinion of Parsons, C.J.). Courts generally
agreed that “a state judgment could be challenged in
other courts for violating general-law rules of personal
jurisdiction,” for the Clause and its implementing
statute only applied “to valid judgments that respected
the prevailing rules.” Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right,
supra, at 1276; see id. at 1269–87.
Even if a judgment had been properly rendered
under the forum State’s law, it would have no effect in
other courts unless it complied with the traditional
limits. See, e.g., Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 612
(Story, Circuit Justice, CCD Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134);
Bartlet v. Knight, 1 Mass. 401, 410 (1805) (opinion of
Sedgwick, J.). In D’Arcy v. Ketchum, this Court
squarely held that the Constitution and Congress had
left intact the “the international law as it existed
among the States in 1790”—concluding that a state
judgment, though authorized by local statute, would
have “force and effect beyond the local jurisdiction”
only if it complied with the “well-established rules of
international law, regulating governments foreign to
each other.” 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 174, 176 (1851); see
also Hall v. Lanning, 91 U.S. 160, 168–69 (1875).
Though the scope of state-court jurisdiction is surely
fundamental to our federal structure, the courts
understood these cases to turn on questions of common
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law and the law of nations, and not of constitutional
law. For most litigants, that changed upon the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment, as a state judgment
asserting jurisdiction could be invalidated on due
process grounds. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732–33
(1878); Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, supra, at
1287–1313. But the States are not “persons” for due
process purposes, see South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966), and they cannot make use of
a due process defense. So the traditional limits on
jurisdiction over States might well be enforced today as
they had been before, by denying recognition on
common-law grounds.3
Even today, the courts will still refuse recognition to
a determination that a State court “had no power to
make.” See Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S.
261, 282–83 (1980) (plurality opinion); accord V.L. v.
E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017, 1020 (2016); Baker v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 240–41 (1998). While the
3 Though this brief uses the terms interchangeably, the common
law applicable to State sovereign immunity may have grown apart
from the law-of-nations doctrines applicable to foreign sovereigns.
Modern international practice arguably reflects a “restrictive”
theory of immunity, which might permit jurisdiction over the in-
state torts alleged by Hyatt, while the American practice regarding
the immunity of the States and of the United States does not.
Compare Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686 n.4 (1999), with Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §451 &
cmt. a (Am. Law. Inst. 1987); id. §454(1) & cmts. a, d. But the
Court may ignore this issue for now. Hyatt has invoked
international law to suggest that sister-state immunity is a matter
of Nevada’s comity and consent, not to argue that the Board lacks
immunity for the type of actions alleged. See BIO 14; see also this
Court’s Rule 15.2.
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Constitution does not stop a State from abrogating
immunity doctrines internally, it also might not help
the State secure recognition for the resulting
judgments.
The Founders might never have specifically
contemplated how recognition doctrines would protect
sister-state immunity: few plaintiffs were bold enough
to bring such suits, and fewer courts were willing to let
them. But the Founding-era law of recognition offered
a wholly adequate means of invalidating such
judgments if they ever arose, and it may do the same
today. In an appropriate case, the Court could address
that law and revisit the relevant portions of Hall.
III. This case is an unsuitable vehicle for
revisiting Nevada v. Hall.
This is not an appropriate case for revisiting Hall. A
State wishing to assert the defenses described above
might have a number of strategic options to avoid the
specter of dueling judgments, asset seizures, and races
to the courthouse described in Hall, 440 U.S. at 429–30
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 443 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Unfortunately, the Board’s strategy—
appearing in state court, litigating the case to
judgment, and seeking federal-question review—may
have placed it outside the protections of the common-
law immunity. This case is therefore a poor vehicle for
revisiting those protections.
What is more, the Board’s strategy has brought this
Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction into question. The
Court’s adjudication of this case sits in violation of the
plain text of the Eleventh Amendment, which limits
the federal courts’ judicial power, and which therefore
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(unlike the immunity preserved in Hans and Alden)
cannot be discarded by waiver or consent.
Because the issues cannot be resolved cleanly in
this case, and especially because the Court’s own
subject-matter jurisdiction is in doubt, the writ should
be dismissed as improvidently granted.
A. States may have effective tools for
resisting sister-state judgments, but the
Board cannot use them.
If a State attempts to abrogate sister-state immunity
within its own courts, the defendant States have a
number of tools for resisting adverse judgments. The
most obvious strategy is simply to default, as Georgia
did in Chisholm, see 2 U.S. at 419, and to resist
enforcement later on. Once Hyatt filed his complaint,
the Board could have ignored the summons, waited for
Hyatt to try to collect elsewhere, and challenged the
judgment then. See Hall, 440 U.S. at 429–30
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Note, Nevada v.
Hall: The Death Knell of Interstate Sovereign
Immunity, 9 Cap. U. L. Rev. 113, 125 & n.78 (1979).
To avoid seizures of its assets in other States, the
Board could also have filed its own action against
Hyatt in federal court (including in this Court, see U.S.
Const. art. III, §2, cl. 2; 28 U.S.C. §1251(b)(3) (2012)).
A federal forum is not necessarily bound by Nevada’s
efforts to abrogate sister-state immunity in its own
courts, just as D’Arcy was not bound by a state statute
asserting an exorbitant personal jurisdiction. When the
Constitution allows for federal jurisdiction without
prescribing a rule of decision, it necessarily “gives
power to decide according to the appropriate law of the
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case,” which in interstate cases will often include the
“principles of the law of nations.” Rhode Island, 37 U.S.
at 737, 748. A federal forum might thus award
declaratory relief to shield the interests of the
defendant State.
Alternatively, California could have filed an original
action against Nevada in this Court, see §1251(a),
seeking a declaration of its entitlement to sister-state
immunity. Again, this Court is not necessarily bound
by a State’s efforts to abrogate immunity in its own
courts. (Indeed, Nevada might well consent to such an
action, as it has joined in asking this Court to overturn
Hall. See Br. for Indiana et al. on Pet. for Cert. 1, 11.)4
The Board did none of these things. It entered an
appearance in the Nevada court, argued the merits,
litigated the case to judgment, and eventually sought
this Court’s review on federal-question grounds. See
Pet. for Cert. 2 (invoking 28 U.S.C. §1257 (2012)); Pet.
Br. 4 (same). That was the wrong approach. Because
the Nevada judgment infringed no federal right, this
Court has no proper means by which to disturb that
judgment. And because the common-law immunity
concerns the State’s amenability to compulsory process,
the Board’s appearance may have waived its ability to
contest the judgment.
4 To the extent that an action for a purely declaratory judgment
might be thought to fall afoul of the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C.
§2283 (2012), that issue can be addressed by Congress, without
this Court needing to distort the constitutional law of immunity.
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1. The Board has no federal right that
supports disturbing the judgment
under review.
Had this case arisen under another head of
jurisdiction, the Court could review the Nevada
judgment in full. But the Board invokes this Court’s
jurisdiction under §1257, apparently because a “title,
right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or
claimed under the Constitution,” §1257(a). This case
does not involve any title or right granted by the
Constitution or any other form of federal law. And the
Court has long recognized that a judgment resting on
“the law of nations” and “principles of general law
alone” cannot support the exercise of federal-question
jurisdiction. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286,
286–87 (1876); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 590, 638 (1875) (“general principles of equity
jurisprudence”).
Modern courts sometimes view interstate disputes
like these as involving “federal common law,” for which
federal-question jurisdiction is sometimes available,
see Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100, 103
(1972); accord Woolhandler, Interstate Sovereign
Immunity, 2006 Sup. Ct. Rev. 249, 261. But the
Founders did not. “Nothing like the theory of
jurisdiction just articulated was generally accepted
until far into the nineteenth century.” Jay, Origins of
Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1231, 1274 (1985). And the relevant statutory provision
addressing appellate review of state judgments refers
to rights and titles granted by “the Constitution or the
treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or
authority exercised under, the United States.”
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§1257(a). Whatever “federal common law” may be, it is
not a Constitution, treaty or statute. The Court
therefore lacks any basis for reversing in this case.
2. The Board’s voluntary appearance
has jeopardized its ability to
challenge the judgment.
Even if this Court could reexamine the Nevada
judgment under a different head of jurisdiction, the
Board’s appearance in Nevada court may have vitiated
the issue. 
While Eleventh Amendment immunity addresses
“[t]he Judicial power of the United States,” U.S. Const.
amend. XI, and is traditionally understood as limiting
the courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction, the traditional
common-law and law-of-nations immunity addressed
the States’ amenability to compulsory process—a topic
in what we would now call personal jurisdiction, and
something that can be waived. See Nelson, supra, at
1565. Historically, a court’s lack of power to compel
attendance was understood to be wholly cured by the
party’s voluntary appearance. See Mayhew v. Thatcher,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 129, 130 (1821); Pollard v. Dwight,
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 421, 428–29 (1808). The same
doctrines were applied to questions of immunity:
Iredell’s Chisholm dissent noted that the issue had not
been squarely presented in an earlier case against
Maryland, “because the Attorney-General of the State
voluntarily appeared,” 2 U.S. at 429.
Today we still recognize that “[b]y submitting to the
jurisdiction of the court,” even “for the limited purpose
of challenging jurisdiction,” a party “agrees to abide by
that court’s determination on the issue of jurisdiction,”
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which “will be res judicata on that issue in future
proceedings.” Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 706 (1982). Here the
courts of Nevada have found jurisdiction to be present,
and there is no federal-question basis on which to
disturb their judgment. And under modern doctrine,
once an issue of jurisdiction has been fully and fairly
litigated and finally decided, the court’s ruling will be
conclusive on the parties. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106,
111 (1963).5
As a result, the Board may well be bound to satisfy
this particular judgment, even if it could successfully
claim immunity in future suits.
B. The Eleventh Amendment may deprive
this Court of jurisdiction.
More urgently, and somewhat ironically, this Court’s
own Article III jurisdiction is itself in serious question.
This lawsuit was commenced in 1998 by Hyatt, then a
citizen of Nevada, see J.A. in No. 02–42, p. 45, against
an entity that both parties treat as the State of
California.6 As such, it is a “suit in law or equity” to
which “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall
5 Durfee suggested that sovereign immunity might present an
exception to this rule, but it noted that “in neither of [the cited]
cases had the jurisdictional issues actually been litigated in the
first forum,” 375 U.S. at 114 & n.12.
6 For Eleventh Amendment purposes, the Court may assume that
the Board stands in for the State, as the petitioner has the burden
of establishing the Court’s jurisdiction. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1042 n.8 (1983). The Board has not claimed to be distinct
from the State, and indeed its position is founded on sharing
California’s sovereign immunity.
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not be construed to extend,” U.S. Const. amend.
XI—and which the federal courts, including this Court,
cannot hear.
To be sure, it was the Board that brought this case
to the Court on petition for certiorari. But the case was
“commenced” by Hyatt, which is what matters for
Eleventh Amendment purposes. As Chief Justice
Marshall explained at length in Cohens v. Virginia, the
party who “commenced or prosecuted” a suit is the one
who initiated the proceedings, not the one who brings
the case to this Court: “Whatever may be the stages of
its progress, the actor is still the same.” 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 264, 408 (1821). Otherwise, no diverse
criminal defendant could ever seek certiorari review of
his state conviction, for that would be prosecuting a
suit against a State. See id. at 410–12. So if Hyatt’s
suit was beyond “[t]he Judicial power of the United
States” when it was commenced in state court, it is also
beyond this Court’s appellate jurisdiction today.
Under current precedent, a State may voluntarily
set aside the Amendment’s limitations on “[t]he
Judicial power,” see Lapides v. Board of Regents, 535
U.S. 613, 616 (2002); id. at 619 (citing Clark v.
Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883); Gunter v. Atl. Coast
Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906)). And these
limitations do not even apply to “appellate review of
state-court judgments,” on the theory that such review
is “inherent in the constitutional plan,” McKesson Corp.
v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18,
28, 30 (1990) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). But the cases do not address the text or
history of the Amendment, which was written to
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confine the power of the federal courts and which
intentionally eliminated the parties’ discretion.
Though the parties have not asked the Court to
reconsider these doctrines, the question of jurisdiction
is one this Court “is bound to ask and answer for itself,
even when not otherwise suggested, and without
respect to the relation of the parties to it”—indeed,
“even though the parties are prepared to concede it.”
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83,
94–95 (1998) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). The Court therefore cannot proceed without
deciding on its own what to make of these dubious
precedents. 
1. The Eleventh Amendment was
enacted as a nonwaivable restriction
on the judicial power of the United
States.
After Chisholm held that States could be called to
answer in federal court, some reform proposals were
framed in terms of the traditional common-law
immunity from suit, protecting the States from
personal jurisdiction and compulsory process in a
federal trial court. See, e.g., Proceedings of the U.S.
House of Representatives (Feb. 19, 1793), Gazette of the
United States (Phila.), Feb. 20, 1793, in 5 DHSC, supra,
at 605, 605–06. But the language that eventually
became the Eleventh Amendment focused instead on
subject-matter jurisdiction and the scope of “The
Judicial Power” as a whole, see Resolution in the
United States Senate (Feb. 20, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra,
at 607, 607–08. There is good reason to think that this
shift in the Amendment’s drafting was meaningful, and
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that it closed the federal courts without exceptions for
waiver or appeal.
By declaring how the original Constitution was to
be “construed,” the Amendment “annulled all
jurisdiction of such cases then pending,” even if “the
court had acted on [the case] for years.” Dudley’s Case,
7 F. Cas. 1150, 1151 (Baldwin, Circuit Justice, CCED
Pa. 1842) (No. 4114); accord Nelson, supra, at 1604 &
n.222. And by restricting the federal judicial power, the
Amendment eliminated any argument that a State’s
appearance reflected consent—for “lawyers of the 1790s
certainly knew of the argument that subject matter
jurisdiction (unlike personal jurisdiction) could not be
conferred by consent.” Nelson, supra, at 1605; accord
id. at 1605 n.223 (citing sources). As the Court in
Rhode Island noted, objections to “the manner of
bringing the defendant into court” are “waived by
submission to the process,” but “appearance does not
cure the defect of judicial power.” 37 U.S. at 719.
Today, it might seem odd to close the courthouse
door to a State that actively desires to open it (and only
to out-of-state plaintiffs). But a blanket prohibition
made good sense at the time. There were a number of
state-diversity suits already pending in federal courts,
and in some of them the States had already entered
appearances. “If the Amendment had simply protected
states against being haled into court, then it might
have had no impact on pending cases in which
(according to [Chisholm]) personal jurisdiction had
already attached.” Nelson, supra, at 1604. (And
restricting the Amendment to trial courts might have
done little good, if this Court could review both “Law
and Fact” in equity cases appealed from state courts.
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U.S. Const. art. III, §2, cl. 2; cf. id. amend. VII.) The
Amendment was designed to do more, as the Supreme
Court confirmed immediately after it was declared
ratified—holding that “there could not be any
jurisdiction, in any case, past or future, in which a
state was sued by the citizens of another state, or by
citizens, or subjects, of any foreign state.”
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 382
(1798) (emphasis added); accord id. at 380 (argument
of counsel) (conceding its application to federal-
question appeals).
“When given its most natural reading, the Eleventh
Amendment creates a second type of sovereign
immunity, which sounds in subject matter jurisdiction
and which therefore cannot be waived”—while the
traditional common-law immunity, which may apply in
“situations that the Eleventh Amendment does not
cover,” can be waived by submitting to the trial court’s
jurisdiction. Nelson, supra, at 1566. Modern doctrine
has sometimes “failed to keep the two tracks separate,”
id.—creating a doctrine with a “hybrid nature,” Wis.
Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 394 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring), in which the Amendment’s
precise terms are treated as a stand-in for “the original
constitutional design” writ large. Alden, 527 U.S. at
722. But distinguishing the constitutional and
common-law immunities lets us read the Eleventh
Amendment’s text for what it says: that it is a precise
limitation on the federal judicial power, and that “suits
covered by the Amendment simply cannot proceed in
federal court.” Nelson, supra, at 1615.
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2. Cases permitting evasion of the
Amendment deserve little deference.
Under modern doctrine, a State is “free to waive its
Eleventh Amendment immunity,” Lapides, 535 U.S. at
618, and such immunity “does not circumscribe ***
appellate review,” McKesson, 496 U.S. at 28. But the
cases which established these propositions do not
wrestle with the text or history, and they can make
little claim to the protections of stare decisis.
To our knowledge, the earliest case to describe
Eleventh Amendment immunity as waivable in federal
court was Clark v. Barnard, which concerned a fund
held by the city of Boston. 108 U.S. at 442.7 The Court
held that it could disregard Eleventh Amendment
issues relating to the treasurer of Rhode Island, named
as an additional party, because of the “voluntary
appearance” of that State “in intervening as a claimant
of the fund in court.” Id. at 447. According to the Court,
“[t]he immunity from suit belonging to a State *** is a
personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure”—
such as by intervening “in a suit, otherwise well
brought,” which would “be a voluntary submission to
[the court’s] jurisdiction.” Id. Because Rhode Island had
“appeared in the cause and presented and prosecuted
a claim to the fund in controversy,” it “became an actor
as well as defendant,” making the proceeding into “one
in the nature of an interpleader.” Id. at 448.
7 Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 304, 309 (1853), was
prosecuted by an individual in state court and then appealed to
this Court; but it was not an Eleventh Amendment case, as the
plaintiff was a citizen of Arkansas. Tr. of Record in Curran, 56 U.S.
304, at 3.
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Clark cited no authority for its assertion that
Eleventh Amendment immunity was waivable. And it
seems to have conflated the State’s ability to prosecute
its own claim before a federal court—which the
Amendment leaves untouched—with an ability to
submit to a federal lawsuit as a defendant. Cf. 3 Joseph
Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States §1683, at 561 (Boston, Hilliard & Gray 1833)
(distinguishing the two). Nonetheless, other cases then
cited Clark, see, e.g., Gunter, 200 U.S. at 284, and the
Court has not looked back since. See, e.g., Lapides, 535
U.S. at 619 (citing Clark); Schacht, 524 U.S. at 389
(same).
Likewise, though McKesson cited “several recent
cases” for the Eleventh Amendment’s nonapplicability
to appeals, 496 U.S. at 28 n.9, these “drive-by
jurisdictional rulings” carry little force, Steel Co., 523
U.S. at 91, as they failed to join issue with the
Constitution’s text. The Amendment unambiguously
limits the judicial power in suits that continue to be
“prosecuted” on appeal, as courts and parties
recognized at the time. See Cohens, 19 U.S. at 408–09;
Hollingsworth, 3 U.S. at 380 (argument of counsel).
And this Court’s “appellate Jurisdiction” only extends
to “other Cases” within the “judicial Power of the
United States,” U.S. Const. art. III, §2, cl. 1–2; there is
no “constitutional plan” for appellate review over and
above the particular grants and limitations of judicial
power. Compare McKesson, 496 U.S. at 30, with
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 87 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(describing McKesson’s reasoning as “specious”). If
Hyatt’s suit was beyond the judicial power when filed
in state court, it is beyond the Court’s jurisdiction now.
34
As the Board notes regarding Hall, in the field of
state sovereign immunity the stare decisis factors are
“at their lowest ebb”; these cases are constitutional, not
statutory, and they do not address questions of primary
conduct. Pet. Br. 13. If a precedent may be measured
by “the quality of its reasoning,” Janus v. Am. Fed’n of
State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138
S. Ct. 2448, 2479 (2018), then Clark and McKesson
deserve little deference. What’s more, these lines of
decisions are inconsistent with the enormous bodies of
precedent on the nonwaivability of subject-matter
jurisdiction and the limited grounds for appellate
review.
The Court’s jurisdiction in this case is therefore in
serious doubt. Because these issues are jurisdictional,
they cannot be ignored. But they also deserve more
extensive consideration than can be provided in an
amicus brief. If the Court does not wish to order
supplemental briefing on jurisdiction, it may wish to
postpone its reconsideration of Hall for a case that
presents the issues more cleanly—for example, one in
which the State is the plaintiff, resisting enforcement
of a default judgment under another head of
jurisdiction.
For now, the Court could dismiss the writ as
improvidently granted, perhaps with an explanatory
opinion. See, e.g., Roper v. Weaver, 550 U.S. 598 (2007)
(per curiam). Alternatively, it should reach the
jurisdictional issue and dismiss the writ for lack of
jurisdiction. If satisfied of its jurisdiction, however, the
Court should affirm the Nevada judgment, for lack of
a federal-question basis on which to disturb it.
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CONCLUSION
The writ of certiorari should be dismissed as
improvidently granted. Alternatively, the writ should
be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, or the judgment
of the Supreme Court of Nevada should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted,
Stephen E. Sachs
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App. 1
Constitution of the United States
Art. III, § 2, cl. 1:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to
all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party;—to Controversies between two or more
States;—between a State and Citizens of another
State;—between Citizens of different States,—between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.
Art. IV, § 1:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of
every other State. And the Congress may by general
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof.
Amend. XI:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.
App. 2
Title 28, United States Code
28 U.S.C. § 1257:
§ 1257. State courts; certiorari
(a) Final judgments or decrees rendered by the
highest court of a State in which a decision could be
had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of
certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the
United States is drawn in question or where the
validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question
on the ground of its being repugnant to the
Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or
where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is
specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or
the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or
authority exercised under, the United States.
(b) For the purposes of this section, the term
“highest court of a State” includes the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals.
